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Montana v. Federal 
Evidence Rules 2013
1 
By Cynthia Ford
I began this series with “A Short History of the Montana 
Rules of Evidence.”  In that article, I reviewed the rule-making 
process which led to the 1976 adoption of the M.R.E. and the 
fact that the M.R.E. are largely based on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (F.R.E.), which became effective two years earlier.  
However, in several important respects, the Montana Evidence 
Commission felt that the existing Montana jurisprudence on a 
particular issue made more sense than the federal counterpart, 
and chose to depart from the federal model.  The Montana 
Commission Comments to each rule state whether that rule was 
drafted to mirror, or deviate from, the corresponding federal 
rule.
Only one of the M.R.E. (Rule 407) has been modified in any 
significant way since they were adopted.  By contrast, the F.R.E. 
have been amended multiple times, and just recently (2011) 
were systematically “restylized.”  Thus, even if the particular 
M.R.E. originally reflected the federal version, subsequent fed-
eral amendments may have caused a diversion if those amend-
ments were substantive.  I recently prepared a short comparison 
of the current F.R.E. and the M.R.E. for my upcoming Evidence 
class at UMLS, and thought it might be helpful to practicing 
lawyers as well.  This comparison is meant to cover major dif-
ferences, and does not include those which I think are minor or 
inconsequential.  
MAJOR DIFFERENCES2 FROM F.R.E.
Judicial Notice, Article II: Montana more detailed
M.R.E. 201 explicitly covers judicial notice of “all facts,” 
whereas F.R.E. 201 is much messier, governing judicial notice 
“of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact” without pro-
viding any definition of either term.  
The F.R.E. Article II on Judicial Notice has only one rule, 
Rule 201.  By contrast, Montana adds M.R.E. 202, “Judicial 
notice of law.” It requires a trial court to take judicial notice of 
the laws (common law, constitutions and statutes) of the United 
States, of Montana, and of every other state, territory and juris-
diction of the United States.  Additionally, Rule 202 lists many 
other types of law which a court may judicially notice of its own 
accord or on request of a party.
Presumptions, Article III: Montana more detailed
F.R.E. 301 is very short and vague, and does not even define 
“presumption.”  Montana’s version is quite a bit longer, defin-
ing presumptions in general and then differentiating between 
conclusive (M.R.E. 301(b)(1) and disputable presumptions 
(M.R.E. 301(b)(2).  The Montana version also details the effect 
of presumptions, the burden of evidence necessary to overcome 
a disputable presumption, and how a judge should cope with 
inconsistent presumptions.
RELEVANCY, ARTICLE IV
Rule 404(a) Character Evidence
Under F.R.E. 404(a)(2), a federal criminal defendant may 
choose to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim.  However, the federal price for doing so is that the pros-
ecutor is now free to do two things: rebut that evidence about 
the victim AND adduce evidence of the same trait of character 
of the defendant.  Under M.R.E. 404(a)(2), the state criminal 
defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the accused, but the prosecutor may only rebut that evidence.  
The Montana prosecutor is not thereby freed to put on evidence 
about the defendant’s character.  
In both state and federal court, in certain types of cases even 
if the defendant does not attempt to prove anything about the 
victim’s character but does put on evidence to show that the 
victim was the first aggressor in the incident, the prosecutor can 
offer evidence about the victim’s character trait of peacefulness.  
The difference is that in federal court, this can occur only in 
homicide cases.  In Montana state court, the prosecutor may use 
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this tool in both homicide and assault cases “where the victim is 
incapable of testifying.” 
Rule 406 Habit Evidence: Montana more specific
In both state and federal courts, the general rule is that char-
acter evidence is not admissible, but habit evidence is admis-
sible as proof of conduct on a particular occasion.  However, 
the F.R.E. do not contain any definition of either “character” 
or “habit” in the rules, although there is some guidance in the 
CAN. The Montana version of Rule 406 does define “habit” and 
furthermore specifies two methods of proving habit, opinion or 
specific instances of conduct “sufficient in number to warrant a 
finding that the habit existed…”  
Rule 408 Settlement Offers and Conduct:  
Federal more specific
In both sets of rules, the general concept is the same, and 
is based on the public policy in favor of settlement of cases.  
Both prohibit evidence of settlement offers and of conduct and 
statements made during settlement negotiations.  However, 
Montana’s ban applies only when the evidence is intended to 
prove liability for or the invalidity of the claim.  An amendment 
to FRE 408 now additionally prohibits use of such evidence for 
impeachment purposes.  Montana has not yet followed suit.
RULE 409 MEDICAL EXPENSES
The exact titles of this rule differ, and that difference in-
dicates the substantive difference in the Montana and federal 
rules.  FRE 409 is “Offers to Pay Medical and Similar Expenses,” 
and prohibits evidence of either offers to pay or actual payment 
of medical, hospital or similar expenses as evidence of liability.   
MRE 409 is “Payment of Expenses.”  By its terms, evidence that 
payment of “expenses occasioned by an injury or occurrence” 
(so not necessarily limited to medical-type expenses) was actu-
ally made is banned, but there is no prohibition about evidence 
that an offer to do so was made.  
SEX OFFENSE CASES: FRE CONTAIN SEVERAL 
SPECIFIC RULES WHICH ARE NOT IN THE MRE
Federal Rule 412: “Rape Shield”—no MRE 412
FRE 412 applies to all federal civil and criminal cases involv-
ing alleged sexual misconduct, and as a general rule prohibits 
evidence of the victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition. 
There are several exceptions outlined in Rule 412.  Montana has 
a similar provision (for criminal cases only), but it is statutory 
rather than a rule of evidence:
M.C.A. § 45-5-511: Provisions generally 
applicable to sexual crimes
 (2) Evidence concerning the sexual conduct of 
the victim is inadmissible in prosecutions under 
this part except evidence of the victim’s past sexual 
conduct with the offender or evidence of specific 
instances of the victim’s sexual activity to show the 
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue 
in the prosecution.
Federal Rules 413-415: Similar Crimes Admissible in 
Civil and Criminal Sexual Assault and Child Molestation 
Cases—no Montana counterpart
The FRE have three specific rules by which Congress meant 
to ensure that the jury would hear evidence that the person 
accused (civilly or criminally) of sexual assault or child molesta-
tion had performed other similar acts, whether or not those ear-
lier acts had resulted in charging or conviction.  There has been 
much academic criticism of those rules.  Montana, like many 
other states, has never adopted any of them.  Thus, in sexual as-
sault and child molestation cases in Montana state courts, MRE 
403 and 404 will govern the admissibility of prior acts by the 
defendant.
PRIVILEGES, ARTICLE V: HUGE DIFFERENCES
In Montana, privileges are statutory only.  M.R.E. 501 states 
that there is no privilege of a witness about any matter unless 
the constitution, statute or court rule provides such a privilege.  
Numerous Montana Supreme Court cases discuss the public 
policy in favor of full disclosure of information helpful to a jury, 
and the resulting narrow construction of even those privileges 
which are provided by statute.  (The Montana privilege statutes 
are located in M.C.A. Title 26, Chapter 1, Part 8).
By contrast, FRE 501 rejects a statutory list of privileged 
communications approach.  Instead, it provides that federal 
evidentiary privileges are to be decided by the federal courts on a 
case-by-case basis:  “The common law—as interpreted by United 
States courts in the light of reason and experience — governs a 
claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise:
•	 the United States Constitution;
•	 a federal statute; or
•	 rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”  
N.B.:  F.R.E. 501 specifically provides that in federal diversity 
of citizenship cases, state privilege law governs for those claims on 
which state law provides the rule of decision. 
In addition to this striking difference in approach, Montana 
and the federal system do not recognize the same privileges as 
a substantive matter.   Montana statutes provide privileges for 
communications between: spouses (criminal only); attorney-cli-
ent; parishioner-clergy; speech pathologist/audiologist-patient; 
psychologist-patient; student-educational employee; domestic 
violence/sexual assault advocate-victim.  There also are privileg-
es for confidential communications made to a public employee, 
and for communications made in the course of mediation.  For 
civil medical malpractice actions only, any apology or expres-
sion of sympathy is privileged.  Montana has a specific “Media 
Confidentiality Act” which statutorily provides a privilege to 
protect media sources. M.C.A. 26-1-901 to 903.  Montana also 
privileges law enforcement officials from disclosing the identity 
of informants.  
Without doing an in-depth review of the federal case law, as 
a general proposition, federal courts recognize: both testimonial 
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and communications privileges for spouses in criminal actions; 
attorney-client privilege; parishioner-clergy privilege; and a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege (which covers licensed clini-
cal social workers as well as psychologists).  There is no doctor-
patient privilege.  The Supreme Court has not decided any cases 
about speech pathologist/audiologist privilege, student-teacher 
privilege, advocate-victim privilege, public employee privilege, 
mediation privilege or apology privilege.  Federal protection of 
the reporter-source communication has been declined.
The M.R.E. has specific rules, 503 and 504, dealing with the 
waiver of privilege, if the holder voluntarily discloses any sig-
nificant part of the privileged matter, unless that disclosure was 
erroneously compelled.  M.R.E. 505 prohibits court and counsel 
from commenting on any claim of privilege.
The F.R.E. contains only one other privilege rule after 501.  
F.R.E. 502, relatively recently adopted, deals with the effect 
of disclosures of information which is protected by either the 
attorney-client privilege or the “work product” doctrine.  This 
rule is specific and complex.  Ironically, Montana does not have 
a counterpart, so that disclosures of this sort are dealt with by 
Montana case law rather than rule or statute.
WITNESSES, ARTICLE VI
Rule 606—Competency of Juror as Witness—one 
difference
The general rule in both the federal and state versions of Rule 
606 is that it is very hard to introduce a juror’s testimony about 
what happened in the jury in order to attack the validity of the 
verdict.  The federal and Montana versions of Rule 606 both ex-
cept (and thus allow) juror testimony about extraneous informa-
tion improperly brought to the attention of the jury, and about 
outside influences brought to bear on any juror.  FRE 606(b)(3) 
also allows juror testimony that a mistake was made in enter-
ing the verdict on the form (for instance, that they agreed on 
$100,000.00 but the foreperson wrote $10,000.00).  MRE 606(b)
(3) instead allows juror testimony about whether there was any 
resort to the determination of chance (such as rolling a dice or a 
coin toss).
Rule 609—Impeachment by Conviction of Crime—huge 
difference
F.R.E. 609 allows the opponent of a witness to present evi-
dence that the witness has previously been convicted of a crime.  
The overall concept is that criminality impacts credibility.  The 
federal rule is specific and complex about what type of crime, and 
how long ago the conviction, in deciding whether the evidence is 
admissible.  
The Montana approach is exactly the opposite, plain and 
sweet: “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime is not 
admissible.”
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY,  
ARTICLE VII
Rule 702 Testimony by experts—very different
FRE 702 was amended to codify the reliability requirements 
for expert testimony imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
Daubert and Kumho Tire cases, which rejected the pre-Rules 
“Frye general acceptance test.”  MRE 702 has not followed suit, 
and does not contain in the language of the rule anything about 
reliability of the expert’s method or application of that method in 
the case at hand.  
Furthermore, the Montana Supreme Court cases do not 
mirror those of the federal court system.  Like the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Montana Supreme Court has rejected the pre-Rules 
“general acceptance” test in favor of a more liberal admissibility.  
However, Montana does not apply Daubert and its progeny to 
all forms of expert testimony.  Montana does use a Daubert-like 
analyses when the expert testimony involves “novel scientific 
evidence:”
Expert testimony regarding novel scientific 
evidence must be reliable. Hulse, ¶ 52 (citing Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 
2786, 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). We have adopted 
non-exclusive factors to consider when determining 
whether novel scientific evidence is reliable, including 
testing, peer review, technique rate of error, standards 
of operation and general acceptance. 
Wheaton v. Bradford, 2013 MT 121, 370 Mont. 93, 
300 P.3d 1162, 1166, footnote 3. 
However, when the testimony does not involve a “novel” 
scientific method, Montana does not require a Daubert analysis.  
“[A]ll scientific expert testimony is not subject to the Daubert 
standard and the Daubert test should only be used to determine 
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.”  Hulse v. State, 
Dep’t of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 1998 MT 108, 289 Mont. 1, 
28, 961 P.2d 75, 91.
Certainly, if a court is presented with an issue 
concerning the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence, … the court must apply the guidelines set 
forth in Daubert, while adhering to the principle set 
forth in Barmeyer. However, if a court is presented 
with an issue concerning the admissibility of scientific 
evidence in general, the court must employ a 
conventional analysis under Rule 702, M.R.Evid.
Hulse v. State, Dep’t of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 1998 MT 
108, 289 Mont. 1, 31, 961 P.2d 75, 93.  
[T]he district court’s gatekeeper role in applying 
the Daubert factors, which guide trial courts in their 
assessment of the reliability of proffered scientific 
expert testimony, applies only to the admission of 
novel scientific evidence in Montana. Damon, ¶ 18. 
Novelty in Montana is assessed from a very narrow 
perspective.
Harris v. Hanson, 2009 MT 13, 349 Mont. 29, 37, 
201 P.3d 151, 158.  
Rule 703—Basis of Expert Opinion—looks but is not  
different in effect
Both the state and federal rules 703 allow an expert to base her 
opinion upon inadmissible evidence, so long as that evidence is 
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of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in her field.  The 
federal version has been amended to add that the otherwise-
inadmissible information is usually not allowed into evidence on 
direct examination of the expert.  The Montana version does not 
contain this stricture, but the Montana Supreme Court has held 
similarly:  “Rule 703, M.R.Evid., anticipates that experts form 
opinions and inferences based upon first-hand observations, 
facts presented at trial and information obtained outside of 
the courtroom prior to trial. The rule recognizes that an expert 
witness may rely upon inadmissible evidence when forming 
an opinion. … However, Rule 703, M.R.Evid., does not give a 
witness permission to repeat inadmissible out-of-court state-
ments to bolster his or her expert opinions before the jury. 
(Citations omitted; emphasis added).  Perdue v. Gagnon Farms, 
Inc., 314 Mont. 303, 313, 65 P.3d 570, 576 (2003).
FRE 706—Court-Appointed Experts: Montana does not 
have any such rule
In the federal system, Rule 706 allows a court to appoint its 
own expert, and sets out the procedure for doing so.  Montana 
does not have any such rule.  
HEARSAY, ARTICLE VIII
Rule 801(d)(1)(A): Nonhearsay by definition: Prior 
Inconsistent Statement of Witness
Montana’s version of this rule treats all prior statements 
which are inconsistent with the witness’ testimony at trial as 
nonhearsay, regardless of when, how, or to whom the statements 
were made.  Thus, a bartender could recount what the witness 
said to him late on a Friday night.  The federal version is much 
more conservative.  In order for a prior inconsistent statement 
to qualify as nonhearsay, it must have been made in a specific 
way (under penalty of perjury) and in a specific setting (at a trial, 
deposition, hearing or “other proceeding”).
Rule 803(3): Exception for Then-Existing Condition
Montana does not extend this exception to statements of 
memory or belief which are offered to prove the fact remem-
bered or believed.  Thus, such statements of memory or belief 
are subject to the hearsay rule.  FRE 803(3) does extend the 
exception to statements of memory or belief, but only if the 
statement relates to the terms or validity of the declarant’s will.  
Rule 803(6): “Business Records” Exception
There are two differences here.  First, the FRE version allows 
a proponent of a business record to satisfy this exception’s foun-
dation either by calling a foundation witness (the custodian of 
the record or “other qualified witness”) or by submitting a cer-
tification which conforms to the self-authentication provisions 
in FRE 902(11) or (12).  Montana requires a foundation witness; 
the MRE do not have any corollary to 902(11) or (12).  
The second difference is that Montana’s version of 803(6) 
adds language not present in the federal rule.  That language 
purports to allow admission of Montana state crime lab reports 
without calling the person(s) who compiled the report, if the 
requisite pretrial notice is provided to the opponent.  (Note 
that the same language used to be found in M.R.E. 803(8), the 
public records exception, but was removed after the Montana 
Supreme Court found that it unconstitutionally violated defen-
dants’ Confrontation rights under the 6th Amendment.  So far, 
there has not been a similar holding re: 803(6), but recent U.S. 
Supreme Court Confrontation Clause cases put this language in 
jeopardy.)
Rule 803(8): Public Records Exception
The two versions of this rule are very different in their length 
and complexity.  The federal rule was greatly simplified and 
shortened in the recent stylistic amendments to the FRE.  The 
Montana version still suffers from the stylistic difficulties of 
the first draft, after which it was modeled.  In addition, it seems 
to exempt from the exception (thus prohibiting as hearsay) a 
greater list than the revised federal rule, but more case law is 
necessary to show whether this is really true.
MRE 803(24) and MRE 804(b)(5): Other exceptions to the 
hearsay rule (the “residual exception”).
The FRE no longer contain these subsections to the rules 
providing exceptions to the hearsay prohibition.  Instead, the 
“residual exception” has been consolidated, and expanded, into 
FRE 807.  Montana does not have a rule 807.  
FRE 807 imposes several requirements for an out-of-court 
statement to be excepted from Rule 802 which do not ap-
pear in either of the separate MRE residual exception clauses.  
Montana’s only requirement is that the proffered hearsay bears 
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” as the 
enumerated exceptions.  The federal rule has additional proce-
dural (pretrial notice) and substantive requirements (that the 
evidence is more probative than other admissible evidence, and 
that the interests of justice will be served by its admission) which 
make the residual exception more difficult to meet.
Rule 804(a): 
Difference 1:  Montana is more liberal about when a wit-
ness is “unavailable,” thus potentially allowing more use of 
the Rule 804 exceptions.
The Montana version of Rule 804 (a)(1) says that “unavail-
ability,” the prerequisite to use of the 804(b) exceptions,  “in-
cludes” the 5 listed specific situations, thus potentially allowing a 
proponent to expand on that list.  The federal version appears to 
be limited to the five listed situations.
Difference 2: FRE 804(a)(5) requires the proponent to have 
tried to obtain testimony OR attendance by the declarant if 
the statement is offered as a statement under belief of im-
minent death, a statement against interest, or a statement of 
personal/family history.  Montana simply requires the attempt 
to have been to obtain the declarant’s attendance at trial.
Rule 804(b)(2) Statements under Belief of Imminent 
Death: FRE version is more restrictive
Montana allows the use of this exception in all types of cases.  
The FRE version restricts it to homicide and civil cases, exclud-
ing other types of criminal cases.
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Rule 804(b)(3): Statements against Interest:   
Montana is more liberal
The FRE version recognizes statements which are against 
only certain types of interests:  proprietary, pecuniary or civil or 
criminal consequences.  The MRE version also includes state-
ments which would “make the declarant an object of hatred, 
ridicule or disgrace.”
Rule 804(b)(6): No such Montana exception
The FRE allow an exception to the hearsay prohibition for 
statements which are offered against a party that wrongfully 
obtained the declarant’s unavailability.  This is an added penalty 
for wrongfully causing a potential witness to be unavailable: the 
wrongdoer both loses his/her/its own ability to profit from the 
absence by invoking a hearsay exception, and may be harmed by 
admission against that party of what would otherwise be barred 
as hearsay.
AUTHENTICATION, ARTICLE IX
The federal version contains two rules which Montana does 
not have, which make a substantial difference in how a propo-
nent obtains admission of certain documents.  The federal meth-
od dispenses with the need for live testimony from the custodian, 
if the record in question has been certified by its custodian.
FRE 902(11): Certified domestic business records: no 
Montana counterpart.
FRE 902(12): Certified foreign business records: no 
Montana counterpart.
Together, these two rules allow a proponent of a business 
record in federal court to meet the authentication requirement 
by submitting a document certified by its custodian, instead of 
having to present live testimony from that custodian that the 
document is indeed a business record. If it is a document from a 
U.S. organization, the certification must meet federal standards.  
If the document is from another country, the certification should 
match the standards of that country.  For both rules, the propo-
nent must provide advance notice so that the opponent has time 
to investigate and object.
BEST EVIDENCE, ARTICLE X
The two articles are basically the same.  Montana’s version is 
slightly more liberal, in allowing admission of not just a duplicate 
but also “a copy of an entry in the regular course of business” in 
lieu of an original in most circumstances.  
Rule 1003: Admissibility of Duplicates: Montana adds 
“[and] copies of certain entries.”  
This is where Montana says that if you can admit either dupli-
cates or copies of entries in the regular course of business” in lieu 
of an original, unless there is some question about the authentic-
ity of the original or other circumstances make this unfair.  The 
federal rule sticks to “duplicates,” which are defined as “accu-
rately reproducing the original.”
Rule 1008: Functions of court and jury: FRE gives the jury a 
role in some circumstances; MRE makes the judge the sole 
decision-maker.
The FRE recognizes, as does the MRE, that the judge ordi-
narily decides whether the proponent has fulfilled the factual 
conditions for admission of “other evidence” (not the original) of 
the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph.  However, 
the FRE specifically assigns to the jury factual decisions about: 
whether the asserted item ever existed; whether another one 
produced is the original; and whether the “other evidence” accu-
rately reflects the content.  MRE 1008 says the court is to decide 
all these issues.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCE
With the help of my fabulous research assistant, Michelle 
Vanisko (3L, would be a terrific hire for next year, just saying), I 
put together a side-by-side table of the M.R.E. v. F.R.E.  It is too 
long to print here, but I have posted it on my faculty page under 
“Helpful Research Links”: http://www.umt.edu/law/faculty/peo-
ple/ford.php.  Again, this is current only through June 2013 but 
you are welcome to download, print and use it with that caveat.
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
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held on a regular basis at schools or community agencies.
•	 Lead a Youth Homelessness Task Force in your community. 
NAEHCY can help you launch this inter-agency collaborative 
to support homeless youth.
•	 Engage in state policy advocacy to support homeless youth. 
NAEHCY’s State Advocacy Toolkit provides ready-to-use 
advocacy tools and sample laws.
How can you find out about opportunities  
to help?
To find out where your services are needed in your commu-
nity, contact the following:
•	 Montana Legal Services Association, www.mtlsa.org. Anyone 
who is being unlawfully denied access to education may apply 
with MLSA by calling the HelpLine at 1-800-666-6899.  Any 
attorney who accepts a pro bono client in this area of law may 
contact MLSA attorney Amy Hall at ahall@mtlsa.org if ad-
ditional support would be helpful.
•	 Heather Denny, Montana’s State Coordinator for the 
Education of Homeless Children and Youth, at 406-444-2036 
or at hdenny@mt.gov. Ms. Denny can also provide contact 
information for local school district McKinney-Vento liaisons.
•	 Montana Coalition for the Homeless, www.mtcoh.org
•	 Tumbleweed in Billings, www.tumbleweedprogram.org
•	 Patricia Julianelle, Legal Director of the National Association 
for the Education of Homeless Children and Youth, at  
pjulianelle@naehcy.org
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